Case 680 Service Manual: Learn How to Repair and Overhaul Your Loader Backhoe

The Case 680B, 680C Backhoe Service Manual PDF includes over 800 pages of technical specifications, step-by-step instructions, illustrations and schematics to guide mechanics through mechanical, electrical and hydraulic repairs. The service manual was digitally reproduced from the original dealer manual into a clear, searchable PDF format and is ideal for mechanics repairing or overhauling the Case 680B/C tractor and loader/backhoe. In addition to all machine systems, engine/fuel repair information is included. This manual can be downloaded instantly to your computer, tablet or smartphone.

Latest edition. The Case 680 service manual includes over 400 pages of technical specifications, step-by-step instructions, illustrations and schematics to guide mechanics through mechanical, electrical and hydraulic repairs. The service manual was digitally reproduced from the original dealer manual into a clear, searchable PDF format and is ideal for mechanics repairing or overhauling the Case 680 tractor loader/backhoe. In addition to all machine systems, gas and diesel engine/fuel repair information is included. This PDF manual can be downloaded instantly to your computer, tablet or smartphone.

Case 680 Service Manual

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Pending before the Court are defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment and defendant's motion to strike. After thoroughly considering the record in this case, the Court holds that defendant's motion to dismiss must be treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied, and that plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment is denied and that defendant's motion to strike is denied.

This case arises out of plaintiffs' allegation that defendant's Career Path Policy ("CPP" or "Policy") violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA" or "Act"), 29 U.S.C. 633a. The Policy requires all Postal Inspectors who reach Level 23 to serve five years in one of thirteen major metropolitan areas. Under the CPP, vacancies in the major metropolitan areas are filled in one of three ways. Vacancies are first filled with voluntary lateral reassignments of Level 23 Postal Inspectors from non-major metropolitan areas. Vacancies are then filled with Level 21 Postal Inspectors within the Region and, if necessary, the Nation who nominate themselves for a promotion to a Level 23 Postal Inspector. Any remaining vacancies are finally filled by directed or involuntary transfers of the most senior Level 23 Postal Inspectors. See Defendant's Exhibit 1, Affidavit of A.R. Caggiano, Attachment 1 at 4. The CPP further provides that Postal Inspectors within five years of retirement who have served two years in a major metropolitan area and have relocated within the last two years as a result of reassignments are exempt from directed transfers. Finally, the CPP permits Postal Inspectors who have served five years in a major metropolitan area to transfer to any area they choose.

Ultimately the EEOC denied the appeals. Subsequently the stay was lifted in the Netherton case and a similar case, Arnold v. United States Postal Service, Civ. No. 85-2571 (filed Aug. 13, 1985) ("Arnold"), was filed on August 13, 1985, in the District of Columbia. In an effort to consolidate the cases, a motion to transfer was filed by plaintiffs in the Netherton case on August 19, 1985. Defendant opposed the motion to transfer and on September 10, 1985, filed a motion for class certification. The Netherton case was transferred from the Middle District of Florida to this Court on August 8, 1986, and the lawsuits were consolidated on September 16, 1986, because of the common questions of law and fact and the identity of parties.

Plaintiffs complain that the CPP violates the ADEA because it has a disparate impact on Postal Inspectors 40 years of age and over. See Complaint para. 5, Netherton v. United States Postal Service, Civ. No. 86-2291 (filed Sept. 28, 1982); Complaint para. 27, Arnold v. United States Postal Service, Civ. No. 85-2571 (filed Aug. 13, 1985). The final agency decisions, however, held that the disparate impact analysis formulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849, 28 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1971), a race discrimination case under Title VII, is not applicable to cases brought pursuant to the ADEA. Arnold Complaint, Exhibit 2 at 7-13 & Exhibit 5 at 5-12. This Court disagrees. Because the remedial language and purpose of Title VII and the ADEA are identical and the rationale of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., mandates the application of the disparate impact analysis under the ADEA, this Court agrees with every other court that has addressed the issue that the disparate impact analysis developed under Title VII is applicable to cases brought under the ADEA.

This Court is not alone in holding that proof of disparate impact may be used to establish a violation of the ADEA. The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits and the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have expressly held that disparate impact analysis may be used in cases brought under the ADEA. See EEOC v. Borden's Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394-95 (9th Cir.1984) (the similar language, structure and purpose of Title VII and the ADEA compels the adoption of disparate impact analysis in cases seeking relief under the ADEA); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir.1983) (explaining how to establish a prima facie case under the ADEA using a disparate impact theory); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2nd Cir.1980) (because the substantive prohibitions of the ADEA were adopted in haec verba from Title VII, the substantive rule permitting proof of disparate impact to establish a claim must also be adopted under the ADEA); EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 632 F. Supp. 343, 370 (E.D.Pa.1986) (following the Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits); EEOC v. Governor Mifflin School District and Governor Mifflin Education Association, 623 F. Supp. 734, 738-41 (E.D.Pa.1985) (same); See also A. Ruzicho & L. Jacobs, Litigating Age Discrimination Cases 2:06 (1986) (Callaghan). In addition, two other circuits, including the District of Columbia Circuit, have implied that the disparate impact theory is available under the ADEA. See Schmid v. Frosch, 680 F.2d 248, 249-50 (D.C.Cir.1982) (implicitly approving a disparate impact theory under the ADEA); Allison v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that jury instructions adequately distinguished between disparate treatment and disparate impact). In short, every court that has confronted the issue has found that disparate impact analysis is applicable in cases brought under the ADEA. Therefore, based on the similarity between the language and purpose of section 623(a) (2) of the ADEA and section 703(a) (2) of Title VII, and persuasive case authority, the Court holds that a violation of the ADEA may be proven by establishing a disparate impact.

Plaintiffs' contend that the CPP, on its face, discriminates against Postal Inspectors on the basis of age. The policy provides that "[w]hen a career path directed transfer is made, it will be the senior Level 23 in the country who has not met the major metropolitan service requirement." Inspection Service Manual 125.14, Attachment 2 to the Affidavit of A.R. Caggianno, Jr. Because the CPP requires that the most senior Level 23 receive a directed transfer first, it does, on its face, discriminate on the basis of seniority. Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 105 S. Ct. 613, 622, 83 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1985) (employer's policy allowing captains who become disqualified for any reason other than age to bump less senior flight engineers is discriminatory on its face); Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711, 98 S. Ct. 1370, 1377, 55 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1978) (employer's policy requiring female employees to make larger contributions to pension fund than male employees is discriminatory on its face). Discrimination on the basis of seniority, however, is not, on its face, discrimination on the basis of age. As plaintiffs admit, no court has expressly held that seniority is inherently related to age. See Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 5 (filed Jan. 22, 1986). Thus, the Court must look at the effect of the directed transfer policy on plaintiffs, which is best demonstrated by statistics. In this case, it is evident that a correlation between age and seniority may exist. See Exhibit C to Kolick Affidavit. Because it appears, however, that a number of more senior Level 23s are younger *684 than less senior Level 23s, see Exhibit C to Kolick Affidavit, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue as to whether the seniority of Level 23 Postal Inspectors is inherently related to age. Moreover, there is a genuine issue as to what statistics are relevant. See supra, p. 682. Therefore, summary judgment for the plaintiffs must be denied because there is a genuine issue as to whether the seniority based directed transfer policy, as applied to the plaintiffs, is a fiortiori discrimination based on age.

29 U.S.C. 633a(c) (emphasis added). Rather than delimit the relief available under section 633a of the ADEA, Congress gave the courts broad power to grant all legal or equitable relief that will fulfill the remedial purpose of the ADEA. The policy behind the ADEA is to make whole any victim of age discrimination. See Dickerson v. DeLuxe Check Printing Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 279 (8th Cir.1983); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir.1982); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1238 (3rd Cir.1977) ("Victims of discrimination are entitled to be restored to the economic position they would have occupied but for the intervening unlawful conduct of employers."); Foster v. Excelsior Springs City Hospital and Convalescent Center, 631 F. Supp. 174, 175 (W.D. Mo.1986); Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1015-16 (W.D.Mo.1984); EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 519 F. Supp. 1328, 1336 (W.D.Pa.1981); DeFries v. Haarhues, 488 F. Supp. 1037, 1044 (C.D. Ill.1980). Although, the most common remedy sought in an ADEA case is an award of back pay intended to make whole the victim of discrimination, see, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 45 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1975) (purpose of back pay is to make whole the victim of discrimination), it is not the only relief that the Court may grant. 2ff7e9595c